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Three articles in this symposium (Donald Kochan, Jonathan 
Macey, and Robert Miller) search for a coherent place for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in today’s jurisprudential 
and economic thought space and fail to find it. One article 
(Andrew Spalding) claims to have done so. 
Professor Kochan’s is the first article skeptical about CSR. 
Professor Kochan uses the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to 
demonstrate his position that CSR-oriented plaintiffs, and their 
lawyers, can best be understood as “rent-seekers.” It bears 
emphasis, however, that Kochan identifies the “rent” being 
sought as of a different nature than that in the usual 
law-and-economics example. The telltale is that the ATS 
plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to seek declaratory judgments, 
creating precedent for future announcements of what the “law of 
nations” requires; rather than monetary damages for their 
clients—when the two are in conflict. One can imagine a private 
settlement with non-disclosed terms being perfectly acceptable to 
the more traditional rent-seeking litigant, but wholly 
unacceptable to the ATS plaintiff, because no “messaging” 
(Kochan’s term) would be accomplished by a non-disclosed 
settlement. 
Kochan’s article thus points toward an interesting area for 
future research: How often, prior to Kiobel, did an ATS suit settle 
for terms that were not disclosed, as compared with a measure of 
any other kind of CSR case? His argument would suggest a 
statistically significant difference. 
In recognizing this likely difference, Kochan raises one other 
point worthy of discussion: In what sense is rent-seeking to 
establish international norms of decency by governments 
different from rent-seeking to transfer influence over corporate 
behavior to employees, members of the community around the 
plant, or a broader environmental community? Kochan treats 
them all the same. Yet, they are different in an important sense: 
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the CSR plaintiff wants to obtain a role in the direction of 
on-going corporate behavior. The ATS plaintiff wants to change 
governmental behavior, and uses the corporation only as a means 
to that end. One might call them both rent-seeking, but in the 
sense that one might (in an extreme example) call a religious 
missionary curing sick people in a third-world country 
rent-seeking because such behavior is pleasing to the missionary 
or will earn her or him a place in heaven. Wanting to change the 
world is different from wanting to take control of a corporation, 
even if the CSR actor believes the latter can lead to the former. 
Professor Kochan’s skepticism about the claims of CSR to 
moral superiority is found as well in Professors Macey and 
Miller’s articles. 
In Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & Economics 
Perspective, Professor Macey makes two fundamental points. The 
fiduciary duty owed by a corporation to someone diminishes in 
value if it is owed to more than one person; and shareholders 
value a fiduciary duty owed to them more than any other 
claimant because they are residual claimants on what flows from 
a corporation’s activities. As a result, corporate social 
responsibility should not replace shareholders’ monetary 
interests in a corporation’s exercise of its fiduciary duty. 
In Coasean Social Responsibility, Professor Miller makes one 
fundamental point. All corporate social responsibility claims are 
indistinguishable from claims to economic benefit; and, in a 
Coasean world with low bargaining costs, the efficient outcome 
will be reached. All else, to Miller, is moral posturing. 
Let me turn to Macey’s second claim first: that shareholders 
value a fiduciary duty more than other claimants do. We can 
apply Miller’s thinking to this proposition. In the presence of low 
bargaining costs, Macey should not need to posit that 
shareholders value fiduciary duties more than others; because, if 
others valued them more, they could bargain with shareholders 
to purchase them. Hence, Macey is either saying he knows all 
such bargaining would lead to shareholders winning the rights 
(perhaps at a price), or that bargaining is so expensive, the Coase 
Theorem cannot apply; and, as a first approximation, according 
the rights to shareholders is more often a correct expression of 
how bargaining would result if it were possible. 
If the former is what he is saying, then there is no need for 
corporate law to award fiduciary rights to shareholders; private 
ordering would do so. 
If the latter is what Macey is saying, Miller’s analysis 
challenges it factually. In each instance of a non-shareholder 
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asserted interest, there is a well-defined group presenting claims 
against the corporation; and in many instances, there are third-
party intermediaries who, lacking a claim on the corporation of 
sufficient monetary importance to compel the corporation’s 
attention, nevertheless serve as monitors for those who do. 
Accordingly, Macey’s entire second claim fits within Miller’s 
conceptual outline. 
However, Miller might be wrong. Let us posit very high 
transactions costs. Then, the law must allocate the fiduciary duty 
to some group since the groups cannot bid for it among 
themselves. The origin of Macey’s claim, that the shareholders 
are the right group to possess the benefit of fiduciary duty, stems 
from a proposition for which he cites Easterbrook and Fischel: 
that the shareholders, as residual claimants, should have the 
right to fiduciary duty since they alone have an interest in the 
entire performance of the corporation, not simply in some part of 
its performance (such as environmental impact, or working 
conditions). Environmentalists can specify some level of global-
warming gas emissions; labor rights activists can pressure the 
company to follow the modern day equivalent of the Sullivan 
principles; but shareholders’ interests are by their nature 
incapable of being so clearly defined. Their interest is for the 
company to make money; how it does so is not subject to any easy 
(and thus contractually enforceable) measurement. 
There is some circularity to this argument, which runs: 
shareholders are residual claimants; residual claimants should 
be the ones to benefit from fiduciary duties; therefore, 
shareholders should be owed fiduciary duties. 
Suppose, however, that the law made environmentalists 
residual claimants. Then, it would follow, that they should have 
the benefit of fiduciary duties. Just by speaking of some level of 
greenhouse gases as a measurable goal, we have not exhausted 
all the interests of the environmentalist claimants any more than 
by saying a certain level of earnings per share exhausts all the 
interests of the shareholders. Companies strive to do more—for 
their residual claimants. If we were to reverse, by law, the 
position of environmentalists and shareholders, making the 
former the residual claimants, and the latter entitled to some 
level of measured earnings, then a fiduciary duty would be owed 
to the environmentalists. The way this would be expressed is: a 
company should manage the reasonable expectations of its 
financial investors for a return, and then do everything in its 
power with what is left to improve the environment. 
To this I can anticipate the response that I have not really 
described shareholders, then, but bond-holders, or preferred 
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shareholders, who have some upside cap on their potential 
earnings. I would agree. But it is in like manner, by describing 
labor and environmental advocates as having narrow, more 
easily defined claims, that Macey has by definition excluded 
them from being residual claimants. Suppose, by contrast, that 
government structures allowed financial interests in a company 
to be only of the bond-holder, or preferred stock kind. Suppose, 
further, the law gave to environmentalist interests the residual 
right that the company must behave in a way that hurts the 
environment to the minimal extent possible, consistent with the 
other claimants’ rights, including the specified interest or 
appreciation of shares owned by those with a financial claim. 
Macey’s logic would proceed to the conclusion that the 
environmentalists, then, as residual claimants, would have the 
right to fiduciary duty. 
So, the syllogism that the residual claimant has the benefit 
of fiduciary rights tells us nothing about who that residual 
claimant should be. 
My hypothetical reversal of environmentalists with 
shareholders is not completely fanciful. In regulated utilities, 
rate-payers hold a position close to my hypothetical. 
Shareholders anticipate a reliable dividend but a lower capital 
appreciation than shareholders in companies not subject to 
public utility regulation. The public utility commission sets 
strictures on the company that incidentally limit profit, in 
furtherance of a goal of providing dependable water, gas, or 
electricity service. Provided the shareholders receive a 
reasonable rate of return, the commission might very well say 
that the public utility’s managers must spend residual earnings 
on improving reliability of service. Who, then, is the residual 
claimant on the activities of a public utility? 
The conclusion I draw is that Miller provides a helpful 
description of how the Coase Theorem makes claims of corporate 
social responsibility quite ordinary, expectable, and efficient. 
Where transaction costs are so high that the Coase Theorem does 
not apply, Macey provides a helpful description of why the 
residual claimant should benefit from fiduciary duties. What has 
not been proven, however, is who that residual claimant should 
be. This is where the normative aspects of this debate enter. 
Miller introduces time-honored notions of morality from Kant 
and Aquinas, to ask whether a corporation reflecting as much 
corporate social responsibility as the claimants urging it are 
willing to pay for, is behaving morally. He reaches an agnostic 
conclusion. Corporations have no souls; they merely facilitate 
collective action by individuals who do. If consumers, employees, 
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and environmentalists want X amount of corporate social 
responsibility, and convey to the company the Y dollars needed to 
bring about X, there is no issue of morality. 
Resort to the political world to vindicate corporate social 
responsibility goals is briefly alluded to by Macey and Miller. I 
believe the treatment of that aspect of corporate social 
responsibility should have been more central in the analysis of 
each author. Laws can, by themselves, make bargaining costs 
extremely high so as to prevent the Coase-like solution Miller 
favors. 
For example, political groups urge laws to compel 
corporations not to pay employees an amount below a certain 
minimum wage. Many individuals are willing to work for a lower 
wage, but it is forbidden. Some then go without jobs because they 
lack the skills necessary to command a wage above the 
minimum. Yet, we have enacted minimum wage laws for a long 
time—because, it is claimed, they are just. There is nothing 
logically different between this historic fact and the same 
politicians enacting laws to make employees the residual 
claimants on a company’s earnings—because it would be just. 
The American labor movement is replete with claims that a job is 
owned by the person who works it, and European land reform 
with the claim that land is owned by the person who tills it.  
What are each of these claims other than an assertion of residual 
claimant status? 
The answer for both Miller and Macey, and for me, has to be 
positive rather than normative. CSR is to be rejected if society 
will have less total output, of everything it values, when residual 
claimants are other than investors. We might still prefer to 
sacrifice some total output, to achieve what many consider a 
more just society; but we should do so in an informed way. The 
advocates for redistribution of income through steeply 
progressing income taxes appear willing to accept less total 
output for what they would consider more justice. Occasionally, 
some try to argue that a lower Gini coefficient (more evenly 
distributed income) induces more economic growth, and, once on 
that ground, I am content to allow application of unbiased 
statistical research decide the outcome. What is intractable, 
however, is that a concept of one person’s (or a majority of voting 
persons’) sense of what is fair is worth sacrificing a greater pie 
for all. The virtue of articles like Macey’s and Miller’s is to force 
to the front the reality that that is, indeed, the fundamental 
question of corporate social responsibility. If that explicit 
trade-off is not at issue, corporate social responsibility holds no 
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different place than an interesting, and occasionally difficult to 
measure, element of profit maximization. 
Up to this point, the articles I have reviewed present a 
universal treatment of CSR as being entitled to no special 
intellectual or moral standing. Professor Spalding tries to even 
that out. 
In The Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial White-Collar 
Crime, Professor Spalding suggests a new role for corporate 
social responsibility. He suggests appeals to CSR could solve a 
failure he sees in neo-classical economic analysis to prescribe 
effective deterrence in the case of extraterritorial white-collar 
crime statutes. 
The problem Spalding takes on is, indeed, interesting and 
timely. The United States has, since at least the Lockheed 
scandal of the 1970s, been attempting to limit bribery by 
companies subject to American jurisdiction in overseas markets. 
The 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act represents the statutory 
enshrining of that effort. American firms have long complained 
that application of such rules to their activities in foreign 
markets simply hands contracts to their competitors from other 
countries, which do not have an equivalent of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. American firms lose out and less “ethical” 
foreign firms win, while the amount of evil activity in the foreign 
(host) country stays the same. 
The foregoing dilemma is described by Spalding as “investor 
substitution.” The investors (or contractors) from the less ethical 
country substitute for the investors from the country trying to 
impose a moral code on its own nationals’ behavior. Spalding also 
offers the concept of a “discretionary investment forum”—
companies under the jurisdiction of the country attempting to 
impose an ethical code can choose simply not to make their 
investment or sales activities in the countries where ethical risks 
exist. This is the self-selection component of the first 
phenomenon Spalding describes, and it leads to the same result. 
Whether because companies from countries that do not impose 
ethical standards outbid them in the host country, or whether the 
risk of incurring legal liability by even entering the host country 
is costly, either way, there is less activity by the companies of the 
country trying to impose an extraterritorial moral code. 
This situation is troublesome. It stems in each case from the 
absence of a single governmental regime: one country prohibits 
unethical behavior in a host country, and another does not, a 
characteristic Spalding calls “selective criminalization.” If all 
countries followed the same rules, or, more simply, if the host 
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country set a standard of behavior at least as high as the most 
demanding foreign country, the problem Spalding identifies 
would not occur. 
There is a prisoner’s dilemma operating here. The companies 
of the country setting the highest standard on its own nationals 
will lose out the most, unless a single regime obtains for all 
companies. One can expect political resistance, accordingly, to 
any effort to adopt an equivalent of the Foreign Sovereign 
Corrupt Practices Act in any country that currently lacks a 
counterpart of it. 
In this, Spalding sees a new role for corporate social 
responsibility, which he argues can create international pressure 
for uniformity of rules. I do not see this as novel. It is the 
standard reply to the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Where each 
country would benefit from eliminating bribery by its national 
firms that carry on business in foreign countries (Spalding’s 
consistent example), but the first country to try to do so will lose 
business, all governments have an incentive to reach a treaty to 
eliminate bribery, and enforce the ban. Bribery distorts 
productive efficiency. The best briber, not the best manufacturer, 
wins in the exporting country. And in the host country, bribery 
denies consumers the benefits of market rents, directing them 
instead to those who have won non-market contests (by getting 
into political power). 
Analogously, this is why countries apply diplomatic efforts to 
arrive at tax treaties, and why they have succeeded in doing so. 
At first, it might seem that a country sacrifices revenue by not 
taxing all international earnings of a transnational company 
with some tie to that country; but if all countries asserted such 
authority, international commerce would be depressed. So, 
countries work out neutral and transparent rules for allocating 
international earnings to be taxed among the several countries 
that could claim to tax the transnational company’s operations, 
so that companies are not subject to multiple taxation exceeding 
100%, or, ideally, the marginal rate of the highest taxing 
jurisdiction. 
The same is true with most corporate social responsibility 
goals; and we can recur to Miller’s article to make the case that 
such goals can be fit within a Coasean framework. It is certainly 
the case with eliminating bribery. 
Other corporate social responsibility goals might fit less 
readily, such as the desire to enforce an international minimum 
wage. There, the host country would suffer a loss of its 
comparative advantage (a cheaper workforce), and so, along with 
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other third world countries, might not agree to the universal 
rule. Solving the prisoner’s dilemma problem for social goals not 
economically beneficial to all countries (even if universally 
adopted) might call on an extra-market effort to change perceived 
national self-interests. But that is not the example Spalding has 
chosen. Economic crime by corporations, bribery in particular, is 
his example, and it fits comfortably in the law and economics 
modality. 
In one part of his article, Spalding attempts to prove too 
much. This is his attempt to prove the theoretical possibility that 
over-deterrence will actually lead to more law breaking in the 
host country. To reach this result, Spalding needs a critical 
assumption: that for country A attempting such laws, there is 
also a country B, whose companies are willing and able to sell 
into the host country, and replace country A’s nationals. If there 
is no such country B, then the desire of country A to diminish 
bribery by its own nationals in the host country would succeed. 
In several highly sophisticated industries, military aircraft, for 
instance, there is often no country B to America’s country A, or 
one with only limited capacity and reliability. American-made 
F-16’s compete with French Mirages in the market to sell fighters 
to the third world, but there is no other supplier in a practical 
sense; and in the eyes of those more expert than I, the Mirage 
might no longer compete. In that situation, the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act could, indeed, have the desired effect of 
reducing bribes. If Lockheed Martin, the F-16’s manufacturer, 
will not pay bribes, and the Mirage is not considered a close 
substitute, there will be fewer bribes with more enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act than with less. Spalding’s case 
could not apply. 
Where it could apply, however, Spalding needs a second 
critical assumption, which he does not make explicit. Further, I 
believe it to be an implausible assumption. 
For illustrative purposes, Spalding posits an iterative 
process. The world starts with no extraterritorial ethics laws, and 
a certain amount of bribery exists in a particular host country. In 
the second time period, one exporter’s country develops such 
laws, and the amount of bribery drops. In a third time period, 
that exporter’s country stiffens its law, and the amount of bribery 
increases—though to a level still less than the original level. To 
make that interesting result work, Spalding needs to have the 
firm subject to the extraterritorial law continue to make bids, 
some with bribes, and some without. As it loses market share to 
firms from the other exporting country, all of whose companies 
pay bribes, the entire amount of bribery in the host country rises. 
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A bundle of bids with and without bribes is supplanted by a 
bundle of bids entirely with bribes. 
However, it is not logical to assume that the companies 
subject to the extraterritorial law will make some bids with and 
some without bribes. More likely is the outcome that every bid 
will always carry a bribe, but that the companies who are 
nationals of the country attempting to apply extraterritorial 
ethics laws will make fewer bids—hoping not to get caught. It 
would be striking if any company would choose to compete with 
another company where the other paid bribes and it did not. So, 
if that is the case, the stiffening of sanctions for extraterritorial 
bribery will shift market share to the companies from a country 
without such laws, but the overall number of bribes will stay the 
same.2 
Spalding does not need to prove this point for his main 
conclusion. He need not prove that bribery will go up with more 
law enforcement of the extraterritorial kind. He need only prove 
it will not go down. To prove the latter, he is on much safer 
ground. 
However, he still has not proven any claim to CSR’s moral 
superiority. The role for corporate social responsibility Spalding 
champions has validity wherever collective goods theory would 
apply: where a regime is better for all, but harmful to a sole 
adapter. Existing law and economics analysis is well able to 
handle that case. International efforts to universalize 
prohibitions against bribery can lead to an efficient outcome by 
solving the prisoner’s dilemma. There is nothing “CSR” about 
that conclusion. Like duplicate taxation of earnings, allocating 
contracts by personal bribes is economically inefficient.  
Suppressing bribery is in the general interest, not because it is 
socially responsible, but because it is economically efficient. 
The articles in this symposium focus on whether there is any 
intellectually coherent content to a claim of corporate social 
responsibility. Spalding attempts to claim so, but his case is one 
of economic efficiency, not CSR moral superiority. Miller and 
Kochan defend the view that CSR has no superior claim to 
shareholders’ interests. Macey attempts to go further: to prove 
that CSR is always a wrong way to allocate corporate rights, but 
his argument contains circularity about the residual claimant 
being the shareholder. It thus devolves into a claim that the 
shareholder is most often the efficient residual claimholder in the 
 
 2 I assume that there is no increasing cost function to making offers for contracts, so 
that shifting market share from one kind of bidder to another will not increase the overall 
cost of making offers. 
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presence of high transactions costs. That may be true, but was 
not proven. 
To take wealth from others to increase one’s own wealth is 
rent-seeking. To do so at the cost of overall efficiency is 
rent-seeking and wasteful. To do so because one claims a higher 
morality than another is judgmental in the highest degree. 
Nevertheless, on occasion, that is what law is called upon to do. 
What else is the “law of nations,” to take Kochan’s example, but a 
code of behavior that purports to be morally superior to the 
behavior of uncivilized peoples? The import of the articles in this 
symposium is that we should be quite cautious before granting 
such a claim of moral superiority to overcome what a reasonably 
free market might otherwise order. 
